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do people work? Some people work only to satisfy elemental
needs, and lose much of their willingness to labor when their income
is high enough to assure physical survival. Others toil for a wide
variety of personal motives: one person to gratify an urge for con-
sumption, display, or gambling; another to achieve wealth, rank, or
social status; another to avoid criticism for being lazy; another out of
habit, boredom, or loneliness; yet another out of altruism, or because
he enjoys his work; and others for reasons such as earning social secu-
rity benefits or forestalling the military draft by entering an essential
occupation.
The external factors that may influence a person in his decision to
work are even more manifold. They include the current level of re-
muneration; the incentive basis by which labor is paid (e.g. piece rates,
over-time premium rates); the nonlabor income of labor; the hours and
pace of a job; the jobs available in the neighborhood, occupation, or
industry; the distribution of income among families and within families;
the level and method of taxation; the amount of personal assets and
their liquidity in time of need; the facilities for credit and the credit-
worthiness of the individual; the availability of social security and
assistance payments for the aged, the sick, or the unemployed, or for
other persons of marginal employability; the restrictions or penalties
affecting the earnings of social security recipients; the presence of
children and other dependents, which may compel some to work and
tie others to the home so they cannot work; the living standard of the
community; the individual's demographic characteristics, such as age,
sex, color, nativity, marital status, and residence; physical and mental
health; and the extent of sports, entertainment and hobbies that com-
pete for a person's time.
Such a lengthy list suggests that economic factors cannot completely
explain labor supply behavior, and challenges the simple postulate of
the classical economists: that people work less as wages increase, be-
cause higher wages enable them to satisfy their needs with less effort.
Nevertheless, we begin with an examination of this postulate, partly
because this simple motivation, if enough people are swayed by it, may
overshadow the other and more complex influences, and partly because
two important studies made by Professor (now Senator) Paul Douglas
indicate that such a claim was borne out by empirical investigation.
The Douglas studies refer only to the association between labor
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force and earnings among large cities and at a given time (the first
study covered 1920 and the second, 1930).' They did not investigate
whether a similar association would appear over time—notably during
peacetime growth, war mobilization or demobilization, or economic
depression and recovery. They did not investigate the connection be-
tween labor force and employment (or unemployment) at a moment
of time, the three-cornered relationship between these and income,
nor the relationship between income and labor force among states, ur-
ban and rural areas of states, or nations. And, lacking the rich store-
house of materials provided by the 1940 and 1950 censuses—which
frees us from the need to rely exclusively on the crude unit of a large
city—they could not examine the labor force participation of wives
according to the income levels of their husbands. Nor did they ex-
plore a great list of other factors which may influence labor force par-
ticipation, either directly or through its connection with earnings:
marriage, the size of the family; child-care responsibilities; the use of
household appliances, factory-produced food, clothing, and commercial
laundries and other services for the home; school attendance; educa-
tional attainment; social security; private retirement systems; the length
of the workweek; income tax; and many others.
This volume has undertaken to fill these gaps in our empirical knowl-
edge of labor force behavior and at the same time to seek some unified
explanation for that behavior. The central questions are: (1) Has labor
force participation been influenced by changes in income and in em-
ployment, and, if so, how and under what circumstances? (2) Are these
two influences powerful enough to stand out over other possible in-
fluences, or do they reveal themselves only when the effects of the
others are removed (held equal)? (3) Does any one among the other
possible influences furnish a fairly complete explanation of labor force
behavior, or must we seek an explanation in some combination of social,
demographic, and economic forces? 2
Itis not easy to isolate the impact of these various factors. Many of
them are so closely intercorrelated that they can act, only jointly. Then,
too, data are often lacking, or not easily related to labor force behavior.
Fortunately, the statistical materials for this study have been unusually
rich and comprehensive, as a result of the vast censuses of population
and current sampling surveys—materials permitting separate examina-
tion of the labor force by age, sex, color, nativity, military status, child-
1PaulH. Douglas, The Theory of Wages, Macmillan, 1934, Chapter XI; Erika
H. Schoenberg and Paul H. Douglas, "Studies in the Supply Curve of Labor,"
Journal of Political Economy, February 1937, pp. 45—79.
The foregoing section on The Problem is a summary of Chapter 2. The con-
cepts, materials, and methods are set forth in detail in the Appendixes and are
summarized in Chapter 8.
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care responsibilities of women, rural and urban residence, the density
of population and the size of cities, income, school attendance, the
amount of education completed, the employment status of the wife by
the income or employment status of the husband, and hours of work.
They also make it possible to study the labor force among different
cities, areas, and nations at a moment of time, as well as within the same
nation over the long and short run; the records of four foreign coun-
tries, as well as the United States, contribute abundantly. And they
permit the testing of labor force participation not only as people be-
come richer over time, but also as they grow poorer (as. a result of
wars or depressions). Such data open inquiry into the sequence of
experience in a way that is impossible when only data on the moment-
of-time behavior among localities are available, as in Douglas' case.
The Findings
The substantive results of the study are introduced in Chapters 4 and
5, which examine labor force participation among different areas and
income groups at a moment of time. These "cross-sectional" analyses
yielded the following results.
THE LABOR FORCE AND INCOME AT A MOMENT OF TIME AMONG CLTthS,
STATES, AND NATIONS (cIIAPnn 4).
•1. In general the labor force seems to vary more among cities, states,
and nations, than would be expected from differences in the size or
composition of population.
2. As was discovered by Paul Douglas, the variations in the propor-
tion of a city's population in the labor force, i.e. its participation rate,
appear to be inversely associated with variations in its average income
per equivalent adult-male worker. The results amplify his findings, as
follows: among 88 large cities in the United States, each 1 per cent
higher real earnings (for equivalent adult males) was associated with
a labor force that was typically about one-sixth of 1 per cent smaller
for both sexes, one-half of 1 per cent for females 14 and older, one-
fourteenth of 1 per cent for males 14 and older, and about one-third
of 1 per cent for men 65 and older. Little or no association was manifest
for males aged 18—64 or for females aged 16—24. There was a wide range
in the amount of these inverse associations among teen-age boys and
girls, but for the whole labor force of both sexes and of males and
females 14 and older, the association remained rather constant.
3. The inverse associations were not found in all comparisons. Al-
though Douglas' findings for the 38 cities in 1920 and .1930 .were sup-
ported by our studies of the same cities in 1900 and 1940, they were
not supported for all classes(whitesand colored combined) or among
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the same 38 cities in 1950. Nor were they upheld among the 48 states
taken as wholes in 1940 or 1950, although different results might have
been encountered had it been possible to adjust state-wide earnings
for the diversity in the cost of living. (They were, however, upheld in
1940 among urban areas of the 48 states).
4. The inverse associations were not the spurious result of concen-
•tration of colored persons in certain low-income cities. They still
obtained when the participation of whites was separated from that
of the colored and correlated for the years 1920, 1930, and 1940 with
male earnings of all classes (data on the earnings of whites and
Negroes separately were not available by city before 1950). In 1950
the inverse association disappeared for white persons (as it did for
all classes), but it was still pronounced between the participation and
the earnings of Negroes.
5. Taking account of differences in unemployment among the cities
did not change Douglas' results for 1930, nor those for the 1940 study.
It might help to explain further the behavior of the labor force in 1950,
but there was no dependable association for any group in any of these
three years between labor force and unemployment, holding earnings
constant.
6. Females did not tend to have higher participation in localities
where the workweek was shorter.
7. The participation of women did not vary in any consistent way
from one area to another with the participation of younger people or
older men.
8. Neither single females, nor wives not living with their husbands
responded noticeably in their participation to variations in female earn-
ings.
9. Significant inverse associations were again found between real
income per worker (or per capita) and labor force participation among
16 nations around 1930 and among 12 nations around Difficulties
of comparing income and labor force among nations make these find-
ings less reliable than those among the 38 cities.
10. Some of the results of the study among nations were close to
those among the 38 cities. In 1930, 1 per cent higher income was
associated with 0.12 per cent lower participation for both sexes 15 and
older, and with 0.40 per cent for females 15 and older (compared with
0.13 and 0.35 per cent respectively among the cities in the same year).
A notable difference was that in 1950 the inverse association persisted
internationally (in 12 nations) but had disappeared, except for Ne-
selection of nations was determined by availability of data; 9 of the
nationswere common to both dates.
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groes, in the 38 cities. Another was the lack of any significant associa-
tion for males 15 and older or for elderly males.
11. Among 11 nations around 1950, elderly males in the labor force
showed some inverse correlation with the proportion drawing old age
benefits. This association could signify either cause or effect; however,
it was a modest one. It may be concluded that—whether or not the
proportion drawing social security benefits is considered—there was
still no significant association between participation of elderly men and
the level of real income per labor force member.
12. A further moment-of-time examination was made of five nations
(whose income and labor force behavior over time are extensively
analyzed in later chapters). Associations among these—observable in
3 around 1900 and 1920, and in all 5 around 1930, 1940, and 1950—
offer the advantage of having been based on more solid data than those
of the 12- and 16-nation studies. For both sexes, males, and females,
associations are inverse in all the censuses, and significant in the 5 na-
tions in 1930, 1940, and 1950 in spite of the small number of observa-
tions. They are similar, numerically, in each of the latter three censuses
and, on the whole, resemble those among the 16 nations around 1930
and among the 38 cities during 1900—1940.
THE LABOR FORCE OF FEMALES AND ThE EARNINGS OF MALES IN
DIFFERENT INCOME GROUPS AT A GIVEN TIME (CHAPTER 5).
1. As noted earlier, the 1940 and 1950 censuses made available data
on labor force participation of wives according to wage and salary
earnings of their husbands. These data apply to different income groups
within a city and are separately classified by age of wife, color of wife,
and possession of children. They reveal that mothers of young children
have much lower participation rates than wives without young chil-
dren, but that—with or without young children—the more prosperous
the husband, the less likely that the wife is in the labor force. The
weighted average for all income levels was about %of1 per cent
smaller labor force of wives for each 1. per cent higher income group
of husbands. The same results are found in both 1940 and 1951.
2. The hypothesis that female participation varies oppositely with
male earnings is strongly supported by data on wives classified by in-
come groups of husbands within a city or nation. The evidence is more
convincing than that based on a heterogeneous unit such as a city or
state without this classification (and it is therefore unfortunate that
data are available only for wives according to their husbands' incomes).
3. Although wives of more prosperous husbands are less apt to be
in the labor force regardless of age, color, or responsibilities for the
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care of children, colored wives are more prone to work than white
wives, even when they are of the same age, have the same child-care
responsibilities, and have husbands in the same income group.
4. There is no convincing evidence that the higher female participa-
tion rate in some areas results from greater employment opportunities
—at least as measured by unemployment of males. Even within each
city the participation of wives of a particular age, color, or child status
was inversely related to the income of husbands, despite the fact that
similar employment opportunities are presumably available to all
women in any given city, regardless of husbands' income. This finding
does not mean that job opportunities have no effect in determining
whether or not women will enter the labor force.
5. Although the labor force tendency of wives does not depend on
size of city, density of rural population, or educational attainment
(below college level), the participation and employment of all females
seems closely related to the extent of their education—more closely,
indeed, than to their age. Among females whose maximum educa-
tion is the completion of. grammar school, the tendency to seek em-
ployment is less closely related to the amount of education than is
the case for males, but among women who have completed one or more
years of high school or college, the reverse is true.
THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE OVER TIME (CHAPTER 6).
1. Female labor force participation has increased in all of the five
countries studied. In the United States the increase per decade has
averaged 17 per 1,000 females aged 14 and older—about the median
for the five countries—and has been reasonably parallel as between
rural and urban areas.
2. The rate of increase has been much greater since around 1930 than
before that time.
3. The increase has not appeared to be associated in any regular
way with that in real disposable income of equivalent adult males,
whether computed per worker or per capita.
4. The, increase in participation has occurred among females in most
of the age groups, in most of the nations, and over most of the decades,
but has been greatest among women 20—64. Decreases have occurred
among females 14—19, elderly women 65 and over, and, in recent
decades, among American colored females of almost all age groups.
5. Among colored females in the United States participation was very
high in earlier years. Between 1930 and 1950 it declined greatly, though
still remaining higher than that of white females. This decrease may
represent a tendency to converge toward the participation level of na-
tive white females, as rising incomes permit more and more colored
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women to adopt living and working patterns of the Americanmiddle
class. (Rising incomes have not reduced the participation of native
white females, but they may have reduced that of colored women
whose incomes have been rising much more sharply than those of
white women, thus enabling them tO realize a long-suppressed desire to
follow the pattern of native white women.)
6. The rates of participation of foreign-born females in the United
States have increased less than those of native white females, The labor
force behavior of American-born descendants of the foreign-born has
been closer tO that of native offspring of native-born parents than to
that of the foreign-born themselves.
7. In the two countries with data affording comparisons over time,
females aged 14—24havetended to increase their participation—even
while more of them have tended to marry or attend school. There has
been a great decline in the proportion of females, i.e., those
who do not attend school, do not work, and are not married.
8. Participation of females has varied widely according to age, mari-
tal status, and period studied; nevertheless, increases have character-
ized the behavior of young and old and married and single females,
and have occurred in recent as well as in earlier years. Standardizing
for marital status has accentuated the increases. The per-decade in-
creases in female participation, standardized for age and marital status,
were typically between 20 and 30 per 1,000 females and older, and
differed surprisingly little among the nations.
9. Comparisons among nations show that there has been no close
relationship between general gains in well-being and the increasing
participation of females—both married and single—in the labor force.
10. The change in the proportion of females who are mothers of
young children seems not to have significantly affected the participa-
tion rate of all females. This does not mean that female participation
is not greatly influenced by the number of children to be cared for, but
merely that the shift in the distribution of the burden of motherhood
does not seem to have had an important effect.
FURTHEB ANALYSIS OF THE INCREASES IN FEMALE LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION OVER TIME 7).
1. During 1890—1950, real disposable personal income per equivalent
adult male employed nearly tripled, rising from about $1,000 to about
$2,700 (in 1929 dollars). According to the moment-of-time association
among 38 American cities discussed in Chapter 4, one would then ex-
pect female participation to decrease from 199 per 1,000 females 14
and older in 1890 to approximately 124 in 1950. Instead, it rose from
.199 to 284—standardized for age and rural-urban residence. Thus the
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excess of actual over expected labor force was 160 per 1,000 females 14
and older in 1950 and totaled about 9 million, or more than half the
entire 1950 female labor force.
2. Illustrative estimates of the possible saving of female labor by the
increased use of household appliances, commercial services, and manu-
factured food and clothing suggest the first two may not have been
very significant but the third could have been more important.
3. In combination, developments in "technology for the home" could
have released a substantial amount of female labor for gainful employ-
ment. However, there was only the crudest information as to their
extent or the ultimate effect of the saving in labor, which could just
as likely have gone into a higher standard of housekeeping or more
leisure for the housewife as into the labor force.
4. A more accountable release of females to the labor force, trace-
able mainly to the lower birth rate since 1890, may stem from the great
decline in the number of persons for whom the average wife, mother,
or helping relative must keep house. Also important is the longer life
span of women due to many fewer deaths from childbirth and disease.
Computations for rural and urban areas, and white and colored popula-
tions in the United States, as well as in Great Britain and Canada (simi-
lar computations could not be made for New Zealand and Germany),
indicate that such factors could have been the source of the entire rise
in female participation in these nations, areas, and groups. Even so,
it is still necessary to consider the employment opportunities and other
inducements which might have determined whether and when employ-
able women would, in fact, enter the labor force.
5. The data on labor force and earnings presented in the study do
not support the hypothesis that the increase in female labor force has
been due to the rising ratio of female to male earnings, at least in recent
decades. -
6.Agriculture lost, and trade gained, in relative importance as em-
ployers of female workers; but in general the industries with high pro-
portions of female workers were about the same in both 1890 and 1950.
Among occupational groups, virtually the entire rise in the ratio of
female to male employment between 1910 and 1950 took place in cleri-
cal occupations. The other major groups—notably professional services,
skilled, and unskilled occupations—maintained their ratio of females to
males at a fairly constant level.
7. There was a strong moment-of-time tendency in the 1940 and 1950
censuses for women with education above high school to have higher
• participation the more years of education they had achieved. And there
was a marked rise over time in the ratio of education completed by
females aged 20 and older to that completed by older men (who re-
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ceived their schooling in years of less educational opportunities and
shorter school terms). The increase in the educational advantage of
young and middle-aged females may help to explain why women
showed an increase in participation while older men showed a loss.
However, the decade-to-decade relationship between these develop-
ments has not been particularly close.
8. The increase in female participation over time was fairly closely
related in the various countries and areas to the shorter standard work-
week in industry. Many housewives, who would otherwise not have had
time both to work and to take care of their homes and their children,
may have been able to take gainful work.
MALES IN THE LABOR FORCE OVER TIME (CHAPTER 8).
1. Male participation has declined since 1890 in all five of the coun-
tries studied. Decreases among males aged 14 and older have clustered
for the most part between 10 and 30 per 1,000 per decade, and almost
without exception have accelerated in recent decades.
2. The declines have occurred simultaneously with increases in in-
come per adult-male worker in all five countries; the relationship is
such, considering the statistical difficulties, as to be consistent with at
least the possibility that the two movements were associated with each
other. Except in Germany, for which any income comparisons are
probably unreliable, the declines have been about 5 to 11 per 1,000
males 14 and older for each $100 increase, or 0.1 to 0.2 for each 1 per
cent increase in real personal disposable income per equivalent adult-
male employed worker. The results for the English-speaking countries
do not differ significantly whether the.income data belong to the year
in which the labor force was enumerated or to the average of that year
and the two preceding years. Per ca pita incomes showed less similarity
in the relation between male participation and income than per worker
incomes.
3. Although considerable changes in the age composition of the male
population have occurred in all five countries, the changes have had
little net effect on the over-all male participation rate: the decline in
the relative number of young males has been balanced by the rise in
the relative number of elderly men.
4. In the United States the extensive migration to urban areas has
also had little net effect on the average participation of males aged
14 and older, since the age groups whose participation differed mark-
edly between rural and urban areas contributed only minor numbers
to the labor force.
5. From 1890 to 1980, participation rates of Negro and foreign-born
males were higher than those of native white males. But in 1940 and
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1950 they declined sharply in all age groups—so sharply that in 1950
a thousand Negro or foreign-born males contributed fewer persons to
the labor force than did a thousand native white males. Nevertheless,
the predominance of native whites was such that the decline in male
participation of all classes differed slightly from that of native whites.
6. Boys and young men under 25 reduced their participation in all
five of the nations studied, in both earlier and recent periods. The de-
cline for boys 14—19 was sizable in all the countries except Germany,
but it varied widely. It was generally greater in the foreign countries
than in the United States and was most marked in Britain. In the United
States it was especially heavy for foreign-born and Negro boys, and
for boys in urban areas. Most of it occurred before 1930, although it
showed concentration for Negro boys in the United States in the period
since 1930, and for British and German. boys since World War II. The
decline in participation of young men 20—24 has been largely confined
to the United States, where, since 1930, it has been sharper than that
for teen-age boys.
7. These declines have shown little relation to changes in income,
but have reflected fairly closely the rise of school attendance in the
countries for which data were available. It is uncertain whether the
growth of school attendance was the cause or the consequence of the
decline in labor force. Both of these changes may have resulted, vail-
ously, from compulsory school laws, increased awareness of the value
of education, and higher incomes permitting parents to dispense with
their children's earnings and to pay higher school taxes.
8. 'Males aged 25 to 64the primary labor force age group—have
also reduced their participation in recent decades,, in almost all of the
five countries. The reductions among men aged 25 to 44 were small
and were probably caused by the post-World War' II rise in school at-
tendance among war veterans aged 25 to 34. The decline in participa-
tion of men aged 45 to 64 was larger, and undoubtedly reflects earlier
retirement; There was a slight tendency of this kind before 1930, and
it has since become much more pronounced. The causes of the declin-
ing participation of men aged 45 to 64 are probably best understood
in the light of the labor force behavior of men aged 65 and older.
OLDER WORKERS IN THE LABOR FORCE 9).
1, With some exceptions, men aged 65 and older have reduced their
participation far more than have young men or teen-age boys. The re-
ductions have been greater in recent than in earlier decades, greater
in foreign countries than in the United States, and in the United States
greater among Negroes than among native whites or foreign-born. In
the United States the decline per decade has amounted to 50 per '1,000
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•elderly men, in New Zealand to well over 100. As a result the latest
censuses show the participation of elderly men to be lower in the for-
eign countries than in the United States. Declines in the foreign coun-
tries were greater also in relation to income changes.
2. The reduced participation of older men has not been the result
of their longer life span. It has not, in this country, .been the result of
their migration from rural to urban areas or their changing composition
as to color and nativity—although such developments have probably
been greater here than in the other nations considered in the study.
3. The extension of pensions and social security and assistance bene-
fits may have influenced the withdrawal of elderly men from the labor
force, especially over the past two decades, but they could not have
been the major factor. Benefits, generally, have been modest; times
when they were relatively meager have sometimes been accompanied
by withdrawals, and times when they were more ample, by increases
• for the group 65 and over; and men under 65, though notordinarily
qualified as recipients, have also left the labor force.
4. If the retirement of elderly men has been influenced by rising real
earnings—which might permit them to save or enable their children
to support them—this influence does not stand out very clearly.
5; There is no evidence that older men have reduced their participa-
tion because they have been physically less able to work in recent years
than older men were in earlier years.
6. Company rules and practices that compel retirement are wide-
spread and are certainly responsible in many cases for the nonpartici-
pation of older workers, but evidence is lacking that (aside from those
rules and practices which are tied to pensions) they are a larger factor
now than they were a generation ago. Certainly they have been in
some effect since the turn of the century.
7. Statistics do not support hypotheses that the declining participa-
tion of older persons has been forced by the rapid advance of tech-
nology, by a decrease •inself-employment, or by an increase in the
size of firms (even though larger firms seem to hire smaller propor-
tions of older men than do smaller firms).
8. There does seem to be some relationship between the declining
participation of elderly men and the male unemployment rate. Elderly
men have dropped out in periods of very high unemployment, with
exodus apparently largest in those industries in which unemployment
was greatest. They have returned in periods of very low unemployment.
But the relationship holds only in the short run and for large changes
in unemployment. In the long run and for mild changesin unemploy-
ment, the decline has not been closely related to the general unemploy-
ment level.
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9. In both the 1940 and 1950 censuses, men participated in close
relation to their education, measured in number of equivalent full-time
years of school completed. In fact, for men without high school educa-
tion, years of school completed seemed more important than age in
determining how large the proportion of men of a given age would
be in the labor force
10. The reluctance of employers to retain or hire older men may
therefore be due in some degree to the better training of the younger
men and women in relation to the pay which they require or which
humane employers feel obliged to give them.
11. This hypothesis receives some support from the great decline
over the past four decades in the ratio of years of school completed
by elderly men to those completed by young men and women—scarcely
more than four-tenths in 1950 from nearly eight-tenths in 1910. This
ratio was not closely related, in detailed movement, to the ratio of
participation of elderly men to that of younger women. But it showed
enough similarity of movement to leave the impression that inferior
education and training is a factor, if only one factor, in the displace-
ment of older men by younger and middle-aged women.
12. If elderly men are being squeezed out by their deficiency in edu-
cation and they will continue to be at a disadvantage in com-
peting for jobs with young men and women so long as the educational
system continues to be highly dynamic; for the benefits of improved
training accrue in the first instance to the young, and reach the elderly
only after a lag of decades.
THE LABOR FORCE IN DEEP DEPRESSIONS (CHAPTER 10).
1. There are various theories about the response of participation to
changes in employment. One is that large numbers of dependents are
pressed into the labor force by widespread joblessness of family bread-
winners during depressions. Another is that many persons of borderline
employability or inclination to work are drawn into the labor force by
the go9d wages and other job attractiOns that prevail during high em-
ployment. A third is that additions occur in response to both very low
and very high employment, with withdrawals occurring during times of
balanced prosperity.
2. The theory that net additions to the labor force accompany de-
pressions, however plausible, seems to gain little support from the
record. Statistics overwhelmingly indicate that more people have been
driven out of the labor force by the unavailability of jobs (or by the
unrewarding and exacting nature of the oniy ones available to second-
ary workers) than have been driven into it by joblessness of family
breadwinners.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
3. The only empirical, evidence of net additions in depressions was
provided by the special Enumerative Check Census, conducted in No-
vember 1937 by postal employees. The tendency revealed by that so-
called census cannot be attributed to differences in concept; but it
stands alone and is directly centradicted by the regular United States
census conducted two and a half years later (when unemployment
was almost as great as in November 1937). Such special surveys may
tend to magnify what they set out to measure (though no such tend-
ency appears in the special state surveys).
4. Under great unemployment the decline in participation was not
confined to the nation as a whole in 1940 compared to 1930 and 1950,
but extended also to rural areas, urban areas, large cities, and the forty-
eight states. It appeared not only in the over-all labor force, but ex-
tended to most male age groups. Rises in participation were manifested
by some young and old groups in certain areas and by some central-age
female groups in others, but no age-sex group showed a consistent
tendency toward higher participation in time of depression.
5. In 1940—a year of severe unemployment—white wives of unem-
ployed husbands, standardized for age and child status, were much
more apt to be in the labor force than wives of employed husbands,
but only in the United States as a whole and in metropolitan areas;
in the smaller urban places and in rural areas, the opposite was true.
Colored wives were less apt to work if their husbands were unem-
ployed, regardless of locale, and whether or not they had young chil-
dren. Materials in the same detail have not yet become available for
1950. Sample summary data suggest that, as in 1940, there was a tend-
ency for white wives to have had higher, and colored wives lower
participation if their husbands were unemployed.
6. Conceivably, many persons who wanted jobs but did not seek
them, believing no work was to be had, may not have been counted
in the labor force. However, the last two censuses provided for the
inclusion of such persons and, beginning with the 1940 census, one may
perhaps assume that people who strongly desired jobs would have been
counted in the labor force even though not actively seeking employ-
ment.
7. The depression behavior of labor force has been observed so far
in comparisons with employment and unemployment but not with
income. Real income per labor force member was depressed well below
trend in every country (in 1940 for the United States and in the early
thirties for the four foreign countries studied), and' real income per
employed worker was depressed in every country, with the possible
exception of Germany.
8. With income per worker depressed, the participation of both sexes
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and of females generally was lower per 100 rise in the number of un-
employed males among the five countries. But the associations among
the countries were too mixed to suggest a systematic tendency for the
relationship between labor force and unemployment to have been
affected by the depression of income.
TilE LABOR FORCE UNDER SHORT-RUN CHANCES: WAR MOBILIZATION
AND DEMOBILIZATION 11).
1. In five years of World War II up to April 1945 the equivalent of
25 million full-time workers moved into civilian and military employ-
ment in the United States, raising the number of equivalent jobholders
from 45to70 million—more than three for every two workers occupied
in the spring of 1940.
2.Theseadditions increased civilian employment by 13 million per-
sons, (nearly 80 per cent) while the armed forces called up 12 million
men. Over 5 million of the equivalent of 25 million workers came from
increases in hours, mostly through overtime; nearly 8 million came
from re-employment of persons who were in the labor force in 1940
but unemployed; and 11.5 million, who represented additions to the
labor force itself, were largely persons who had been attending school,
engaged in housework, or retired.
3. During the five-year period, the number of employed persons,
including civilian and military workers, increased 42 per cent in the
United States, which was slightly more than in Canada, three times as
much as in Britain, and four times as much as in Germany. (This is
so even if active armed forces and 7 million foreigners are counted in
the German work forces; in fact if only German citizens are counted,
the number of additional Germans mobilized for civilian and military
employment barely rose at all). Civilian employment increased a sixth
in the United States and possibly a fifth in Canada. Britain and Ger-
many were less fortunate in this respect. Britain, with slower popula-
tion growth and less prewar unemployment than the two North Ameri-
can nations, had suffered an actual diminution in its civilian employ-
ment of about 4 per cent by 1943 and 8 per cent by 1945; it was only
possible to make up the 4 per cent decline in 1943 by asking the aver-
age worker to put in 9 per cent more hours in each workweek. German
civilian employment fell and by mid-1948 it was over a fifth below
1939; if foreigners are counted, civilian employment was only a fif-
teenth below mid-1943. In the case of Germany, compensating exten-
sions in hours were minor, for its workweek was lengthened only 4
per cent in the first two years and it lost most of that increase by 1944.
4. Excluding these, however, the labor force rose 8.5 million in the
United States, 1.8 million in Britain, and 0.6 million in Canada. In the
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United States, the rise was from 54.1 per cent of the population 14 and
older before the war to 62.3 per cent at the war peak, or 8.2 per cent
compared with 6.8 in Canada and 4.7 per cent in Great Britain. In some
degree, the comparison with prewar is.unduly favorable to the United
States and Canada and unfavorable to Great Britain, for the labor force
participation rates of the United States and Canada were depressed in
1940 or 1989 whereas that of Britain was expanded somewhat in view
of the war mobilization akeady partly in effect in 1939. Based on post-
war (1947) labor force participation, the wartime excess is 6.4 per cent
in United States, 5.4 per cent in Britain, and 5.1 per cent in Canada.
5.Onany basis of comparison Germany made the poorest record
for wartime additions. Its labor force lost native Germans, even aside
from war deaths; counting foreigners in its labor force, the expansion
was still much less than that in the United States. The relative failure
of Germany to get of its citizens to seek work cannot be attributed
to emigration, Allied bombing, "high" birth rates, small reserves of
women in the peacetime labor force, or a more complete labor force
mobilization at the start of the war.
6. The inflows to the labor force in the various countries were domi-
nated by the military draft. Until the armed forces were enlarged,
labor force expansion was negligible. With demobilization of nine-
tenths of the peak armed strength, the United States labor force shrank
eight-tenths of its excess over prewar size (disregarding the population
growth). An average for the war of about 70 persons was added to the
United States labor force for every 100 men taken into the armed forces.
However, the addition was not uniform from year to year. It was rela-
tively large—between 70 and 119—early in the war and relatively small
—about 50—in the last two years of war. The five-year average, 72, was
almost the same as Canada's during 1939—1945. Labor force increase
measured against the military draft was very different in Great Britain,
where it was 47 during 1939—1943 and a substantial negative amount
during the two last years, and in Germany, where it was zero or nega-
tive during 1939—1944.
7. In this country females accounted for slightly more than half the
wartime addition to the labor force (including the part due to popula-
tion growth); in Britain for eight-tenths. Excluding the part due to
population rise, the United States added 35 females for every 100 fe-
males at work before the war, Britain 21, and Canada 19 (compared
with 1941); Germany relinquished 1. For every hundred males at work
before the war the United States added 9, Canada 6, Britain 2, and
Germany 0.3.
8. Besides the increases in employment and hours worked, there
were large transfers from less essential to more essential jobs. The major
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shifts to war production in all four countries named above probably.
occurred within industries. Nevertheless, mobility between industries
was not lacking. In the United States all industry groups except agri-
culture gained workers early in the war. By 1943, industrial employ-
ment had exceeded 1989 levels by about half. By 1945, transportation
had expanded almost three-fourths over 1939; services (including gov-
ernment) over a fourth; trade, distribution, and finance remained about
steady.
9. Great Britain's industrial employment decreased after 1942, and
in 1945 was lower than in 1939; however, the fluctuations were never
wide. Agriculture, services, and transportation changed little during
the six years, and commerce, trade, and finance lost heavily between
1939 and 1943. Britain built up its war industries and agriculture by
severely curtailing domestic services, construction, trade, distribution,
finance, and the manufacture of clothes, food, and beverages.
10. The Germans were less ingenious Or less determined than the
British in restricting nonessentials. Throughout the war, domestic
service, employing chiefly native Germans, was almost undisturbed.
Agriculture and industry parted with workers at first, but by the war's
end had about retrieved what they had lost at the war's start. Employ-
ment fell in most service industries, also in commerce, trade, and fi-
nance. Transportation made negligible gains.
11. In none of the countries was direct compulsion the major factor
in recruiting wartime labor. The United States never required civilians
to work. Germany had universal conscription on paper but did not
thoroughly enforce it until after the Allied landing, when it was too
late to use the extra labor effectively. Half of Britain's additions were
made before the National Service Act. Even after that, its policy was
still persuasion. Coercion was not relied upon extensively until the last
two years, during which, paradoxically, the labor force as a whole and
essential employment both declined.
12. Wartime movements into the labor force may have been in-
fluenced by four factors: (1) reserves of labor among students, house-
wives, and the elderly; (2) the extent to which care of families pre-
vented girls and women from taking gainful work; (3) government
allowances to dependents of fighting men;. (4) the strength of enemy
blows. These factors help to explain the large proportion added in the
United States, which had a larger reservoir of females outside its peace-•
time labor force than either Britain or Germany. Allotments to de-
pendents of fighting men in the United States, though by no means
• niggardly, were smaller relatively than in Germany or Canada, but
were not reduced if the recipient worked for pay, though they were in
the other two countries. •
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13. Most additions to the labor force during the war came when the
enemy was hitting hardest. In Britain six in ten ofthe additions were
made before the U.S.S.R. entered the war; in this country two in three
came during the two years before the Italian surrender in mid-1943; in
Germany the few additional native workers entered after the Stalingrad
disaster. Canada, an auxiliary belligerent, distributed its expansion
fairly evenly throughout the five years of the war.
14. The homeward-bound armed forces of the three English-speak-
ing victors trailed the exodus of civilians. Civilian workers, so many
of them women, quit war industries first, shifting into less essential
sectors perhaps, and then leaving the labor force to return home and
await the returning warriors. The entire shrinkage of the labor force in
the United States occurred between March 1945 and May 1946; it took
longer in Canada and Britain but was about complete by early 1947.
15. Aside from the wartime increase in labor force attributable to
population growth, the great bulk of additions proved to be temporary
in three countries. (No satisfactory postwar comparisons can be made
for dismembered Germany.) In America postwar participation did not
decrease to the 1940 level, a fact that misled many into believing it
was still expanded from the war. This mistake arose from the failure
to perceive that the labor force at the turn of the 1940 s had been some-
what depressed, probably by the widespread unemployment.
16. In the Korean conflict, the labor force showed signs of retracing
its early World War H pattern by rising as the armed forces expanded.
However, the ratio of its increase to recruitments was much less than
half that in 1941—1943, possibly because in April 1940 the labor force
had been, proportionately, depressed. With the approaching end of the
conflict the labor force proportion returned to near peacetime propor-
tions without any appreciable demobilization of armed forces.
THELABORFORCE UNDER SHORT-RUN CHANCES (cPTER 11,
concluded).
1. In time of peace the total labor force in the United States has
been a relatively stable proportion of the total population 14 and older
in the short run. Since 1946 the maximum fluctuation in participation,
seasonally adjusted, has been well under 3 per cent of the working-age
population. The labor force data are based on interviews conducted
each month with a representative sample of the nation's households,
and a good part of the range of fluctuation—perhaps all of it—could
have been the result of errors in sampling or in interviewing. The fluc-
tuation in Canada has been slightly greater than in the United. States,
partly perhaps because the data during much of the postwar period
iii that country were quarterly estimates instead of quarterly averages.
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2. An analysis by means of partial correlation (holding unemploy-
ment and armed forces constant) suggests that during the World War
II period (1940—1946) there may have been a significant inverse asso-
ciation between real income and participation for all groups except
persons 65 and older, and a significant positive association between
money hourly earnings and participation, the same group excepted.
But during the postwar period (1946—1952) the correlations showed
little agreement in sign either from one group to another or from war
to postwar years. On the basis of this evidence it is not possible to
claim a dependable association between participation and income or
earnings during the period from 1940 to 1952.
3. The armed forces have had a clear-cut association in size with
the labor force in the United States, but only when the number of men
in uniform has varied on a grand scale, as in World War II. There are
theoretical reasons for believing that the armed force changes caused
the labor force changes. The small-scale changes in the armed forces
during the period between the end of World War II and the beginning
of the Korean conflict had some association with the labor force in both
the United States and Canada, but the association was not strong in
the United States and it was weaker in Canada—doubtless partly be-
cause the small labor force changes were obscured by sampling and
interview error.
4. The peacetime labor force behavior has not been fundamentally
different in the short run from the long run, or in periods of "full"
employment from periods of less than full employment.
5. What information we have on "gross changes" in the labor force
(the sum of persons who enter and leave in any month) suggests that
they have occurred at a regular rate and have not been responsive to
variations in income and unemployment.
6. Neither the total labor force nor the major age-sex groups behaved
in the relatively mild recessions of 1949—1950 or 1953—1954 in a manner
to confirm any theory that unemployment drives a net number of work-
ers into or out of the labor force. The partial correlations between labor
force and unemployment in the postwar period (holding armed forces
and income or earnings constant) suggest a larger participation when
unemployment was larger, but they are generally insignificant or only
mildly significant. There, was no dependable reaction of participation
to unemployment in these recessions.
THE STABLE LABOR FORCE UNDER RISING INCOMES AND HIGH
EMPLOYMENT (cIIAPmJI 12).
1. The over-all labor force participation rate has been rather im-
pressively stable from one high-employment cenSus year to another.
The stability .has held for the United States since 1890 and possibly
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since 1820;forGreat Britain since 1911 and possibly since 1841; for
Canada since 1911; for New Zealand during 1896—1951; and for Ger-
many during 1895—1939. In none of the countries or ruraland urban
areas has the average variation been more than 1.7 per cent of the total
working-age population. In the United States during 1890—1950 the
maximum fluctuation between successive high-employment census
dates was less than the normal seasonal variation in any given year.
2. The labor force has been a stable proportion of the working-age
population—adjusted or unadjusted for undercounts and overcounts
at certain censuses, and standardized or unstandardized for changes
in the composition of the population. However, the over-all participa-
tion rate has been especially stable in the United States when standard-
ized with respect to age, sex, rural and urban residence, color, and
nativity, and in the other four countries with respect to age and sex
(other standardizations not being possible).
3. In the United States the stability has also extended to rural areas,
urban areas, and large cities taken in the aggregate, though not indi-
vidually. In Canada, it seems much less marked; but requisite data
are available only for 1941 (a World War II year) and 1951, and it has
not been possible to standardize directly within rural and urban
Canada for changes in age and sex composition.
4. Labor force participation has remained relatively stable in all
the five countries during periods of increase in real annual disposable
income per adult-male equivalent worker, or per capita. All the coun-
tries except Germany where income changes were small and uncertain
manifested substantial income increases over the long run and for al-
most every decade.
5. The stability for the United States has been due to the behavior
of the native white population. Both colored and foreign-born have
reduced their participation by impressive amounts; in the case of Ne-
groes nearly all of the reduction has occurred since 1930. The foreign-
born, the native-born children of the foreign-born, and Negroes have
all tended in recent decades to align their participation to the same
level as that of native whites.
6. The over-all participation rate has remained stable in spite of
marked changes for major age and sex groups. In all five countries
participation has decreased to some extent for every male age group
and increased for most female groups. The net change in the over-all
labor force has generally been only a small percentage of the gross
change.
7. The over-all stability of participation has also been marked when
compared with changes in unemployment, or with seasonal changes in
the labor force itself.
8. The stability of the labor force has been measured without regard
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to the fact that some persons hold more than one job. Sample data in
the United States over the last decade indicate that dual job-holding
has been rather small and (until recently) constant despite. great
changes in the labor market. Recently dual job-holding seems to have
increased somewhat, though what appears to be an increase may be
the result of improvements in measurement techniques. Much of it is
actually sequential (meaning that a person gives up one job on Tues-
day and takes another on Thursday, thus holding two jobs in the same
week), or nominal (holding two jobs but working at only one of them).
9. The stability of participation that we find in the United States in
38 large cities, taken in the aggregate, has been less impressive in
those same cities taken individually.
10. Individual cities did not have very stable participation rates for
whites. For Negroes the rates were unstable, declining in
every city for both sexes, for males, and for females.
11. The changes for whites and Negroes in the individual cities were
not associated dependably with changes in size of city, with change in
male earnings or in levels of male earnings, or with variations in job
opportunity as reflected in unemployment rates.
12. White participation showed some tendency to rise in cities hav-
ing small proportions of foreign-born.
13. White female participation rose in most cities simultaneously
with a general decrease in the relative number of white children to be
cared for, but the sizes of these changes were not significantly corre-
lated. Among Negro females, however, the decline in labor force par-
ticipation was significantly associated with the rise in the relative num-
ber of children (the latter occurring in nearly all cities as a result of a
higher rate of survival of Negro children).
14. Participation rates of Negroes tended to decrease most in those
cities where they had been highest to begin with, and were more nearly
equal among cities in 1950 than in 1920. No such development could
be discovered among the whites.
OVER-ALL STABILITY versus INTERNAL INSTABILITY IN A NATION'S
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION (CHAPTER13).
1. The fact that the over-all participation rate was stable in each of
the five countries and in rural and urban areas of the United States,
despite great internal changes, raises the question whether the stability
has been due to some systematic tendency for the internal changes to
offset each other.
2. There is, in fact, some statistical indication that in all the countries
and areas participation rates of various female age groups have risen
in a manner to offset the declines in male participation rates. The corre-
lations between male and female participation have not been significant,
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unless the data of war-torn Germany are excluded from the comparison,
and in any case are not strong. Yet nearly all the coefficients are of the
same inverse sign and, considering the element of randomnessin the
underlying data, seem to call for •some explanation of how such a
relationship could exist.
8. The hypothesis is advanced here that women may have both
pushed and pulled young and elderly males from the labor force, to
some extent seeking jobs that had been or were being sought bymales,
and to some extent being drawn into 'the labor force by the vacuum
left by the exodus of males for other reasons.
4. The source of the influx of females could be their release from
housework—as the result of the developing technology for the home,
fewer children to be cared for, and the increased number of women
surviving childbirth and disease. The demand could be explained by
the expansion of clerical occupations which, with the great increase in
educational attainment of the average female, opened new job oppor-
tunities to her. The timing could be reconciled with the shorter normal
workweek in industry, which made it further possible for many females
having household responsibilities to enter the labor force.
5. The hypothesis that the rising participation of females played a
role in the declining participation of youths need not be discarded
merely because that decline was reflected fairly closely in the rise of
youths attending school. Some of those who entered school undoubt-
edly did so for cultural and legal reasons; as they left the labor force,
a gap would have been created which women would have been called
upon to fill. Others may have sought education because the good jobs
were taken by the mature and better trained women. Many were able
to remain in high school or college because working female relatives
were contributing to family earnings.
6. The decline in the participation of older men45 to 64, and 65
and older—has not been as easy to explain on independent grounds
as that of the school-age males. No statistical evidence could be found,
in either this or other studies, that the decline has been the immediate
result of increases in real income, extension of pensions and social se-
curity, physical deterioration (compared with elderly men in earlier
periods), or of changes in self-employment, the pace of industry, or'
the level of employment. Even if a tightening of company rules and
practices against hiring and retaining older workers had been primarily
responsible (there was no lack of such discrimination a half century
ago), the reason for the tightening would need to be explained. Em-
ployers would surely have been less ready to part with this supply of
labor had there not been available a new and better source—namely
women.
7. It would seem plausible—in view of the close moment-of-time
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relationship between education completed and participation, and of
the great increase in the ratio of education completed by women to
that completed by elderly men—that women displaced elderly men
because of their better training for many clerical, personal service, and
professional jobs in comparison to their relative wages. And financial
assistance from a working daughter or wife—even her ability to sup-
port herself without help—doubtless aided many a sick or unemployed
man to advance his retirement.
8. Over-all participation remained stable although the amount of
leisure increased, the increase having taken the form of reductions in
normal working hours for the average labor force member.
9. Reductions in the full-time workweek occurred in every one of
the four nations for which standard hours data could. be compiled, and
they occurred between every census date, except in Hitler Germany
between 1933 and 1939. The average reductions per decade were rather
remarkably uniform among the four nations, but there were wide varia-
tions from one decade to the next. And there seemed to be no depend-
able association over the short run between reductions in hours and
increases in income in the short run. Yet there was sufficient possibility
that income increases played a long-run role (in the sense of inducing
or enabling people to work less) to justify asking why reductions should
have taken place in hours instead of in over-all participation.
10. There are grounds for believing that a reduction in hours offered
a more convenient and more flexible device for distributing, among
workers and over time, any increase in leisure that might be demanded
as a result of rising incomes. The large rise in the number of households
relative to the population has meant that a greater number of workers
was needed merely to provide each household with a primary worker.
The great majority of families had no more than one worker at the
start and consequently could not have parted with a full-time labor
force member—at least not permanently. Temporary or spasmodic peri-
ods away from work may jeopardize a person's job and in any case
may result in an uneven distribution of leisure over the year.
11. If people have sought more leisure as a result of rising incomes,
it is likely that all the members of a family wish to share in this leisure
by means of a shorter workweek for all—instead of having some mem-
bers continue to work an undiminished week and others withdraw al-
together from the labor force; a reduction in hours therefore seems
a more equitable device for distributing leisure among individuals and
groups.
12. This latter expectation is apparently contradicted by the fact
that the decline in the participation of males and the rise in the par-
ticipation of females have shifted much of the burden of work from
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men to women. But if account is taken of the decline in thehousekeep-
ing responsibilities of women as a result of technological and demo-
graphic developments, and of the extent to which men have taken
over many chores formerly done by women in the home, servants,and
maintenance services, it may be that the decrease in work and the in-
crease in leisure have been fairly evenly distributed after all.
13. Workers who desired a longer workweek so as to allow other
members of the family to withdraw altogether from the labor force
are not likely to have influenced the average workweek appreciably.
Technical conditions of production press toward uniform hours
throughout a factory or store, regardless of the wishes of a minority.
14. Once normal working hours had been reduced, all sorts of ob-
stacles would have prevented their being raised again: a tendency for
shorter hours to be frozen into maximum hours, union agreements, fac-
tory shift schedules, commuting arrangements, and pace of work.
15. In the future, unions will probably play a leading role in initiat-
ing and furthering reductions in the full-time workweek, even if their
role in the past has not been the dominant one. Unions are, of course,
far more powerful now than during the years when most reductions in
working hours occurred. And a curtailment in the workweek is likely
to be more acceptable to unions than a reduction in the labor force, if
only as a device for spreading work among as many workers as possible
in a time of declining employment. It should not be surprising if reduc-
tions in the labor supply continue to take the form of fewer hours, and
perhaps less effort per hour, rather than of reduced participation, nor
if the over-all labor force continues to stay rather close to its present
and past percentages of working-age population.
16. The decline in participation of the foreign-born and Negroes in
the United States raises the question of why the native whites or the
all classes did not also show declines. The explanation may be that these
minority groups—as their more sharply rising incomes converged to-
ward those of the native whites—tended to adopt the working habits
of the latter. This view is supporte.d by the fact that among the various
cities participation rates of female Negroes tended to become not only
more like those of native whites, but also more like those of other female
Negroes in other cities. As the remaining barriers to equal participation
in the economic life of the nation break down, the Negro may aspire in
an increasing degree to live and work like other Americans of the same
income group.
17. Participation rates have not been stable in individual cities over
time even for whites, nor in cities where the instability could not be
attributed to the presence of large numbers of foreign-born.
18. This lack of stability may occur because persons already corn-
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nutted to the labor force tend to migrate to cities of high pay and good
job opportunities, but this explanation does not seem to have strong
statistical support, and we are obliged to let the instability in individual
cities stand as an unexplained exception to the stability we have found
for over-all labor force participation over time.
Concluding Observations on the Main Question: Is the
Labor Force Influenced by Changes in
Income and Employment?
At the start of this investigation, we posed three central questions: (1)
Has labor force participation been influenced by changes in income
and employment? (2) Has the influence, if effective, been powerful
enough to stand out over other possible forces? (3) Of these other pos-
sible forces, have there been any which account for that part of labor
force behavior not explained by income or employment?
It is unfortunate that a detailed and protracted search into an un-
usually rich and varied lode of statIstical material has left our answers
incomplete. For all the economic, social, and demographic forces ana-
lyzed in this study, many others had to be neglected, among them
some likely to be influential.4
Differences in family characteristics. Large and small families may
have very different participation rates, as may families with high and
low incomes per member—and differences remain after standardiza-
tion for age, sex, color, or other demographic differences, or after talc-
ing into account the income of the head of the family. Unfortunately
the census, while it has given a great deal of family information on
both labor force and population, has never classified the data for com-
puting participation rates of families; yet many of the decisions to enter
or leave the labor force are family decisions.
Changing community attitudes. The family and the community have
greatly altered their attitudes toward the question of whether wives
and children should work. Is the change in attitudes the cause, or the
effect, of the increased participation of females and the decreased par-
ticipation of children? Possibly, both attitudes and participation
changes gradually molded each other or both were shaped more or
less simultaneously by still other social forces.
Differences in social class. A powerful motivating force in Western
societies is the aspiration to advance oneself and one's children to a
'This study has omitted the analysis of the effects of income tax on labor force
participation. However, the writer has presented such an analysis in a paper
to a subcommittee of Congress: Clarence D. Long, "Impact of Federal Income
Tax on Labor Force Participation," Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing be-
fore the Subcommittee on Tax Policy, Joint Committee on the Economic Report,
84th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 9, 1955, pp. 153—166.
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higher social class. Thisaspirationmay be realized by working harder,
by a wife's gainful employment, by restricting the size of the family,
and by sustaining children in school longer before they enter the labor
force. Social aspiration may be more powerful than any of the tangible
influences, but there are no statistics by which to measure its impact,
and we can only derive insights through observation.5
Social life and the /ob: The growth of large cities and the increasing
anonymity of urban life may have caused women and older people. to
depend more on their jobs for companionship or marriage opportu-
nities. The impact of this development would be all the greater, of
course, as the socip] conditions of work beèame more agreeable.
Changing conditions of work. The last half century has seen a distinct
improvement in working conditions—cleaner surroundings, abundance
of rest-room facilities, and safety measures, as well as the courtesy of
supervisors, fairness of grievance procedures, seniority protection, and
coffee breaks and adequate limch periods, to name some—which may
well have persuaded many women to enter or to remain in gainful
employment.
Intensity of effort required of the employee. It seems impossible to
say quantitatively that there has been a decline in the intensity of
effort in an hour of work; at least one British observer has concluded
that the pace of work is slower in Britain than it was in the nineteenth
century,6 but such judgments must rest largely on qualitative observa-
tions because of the. tremendous difficulty of measuring personal effort.
Participation would surely be affected to some extent by the ability or
inability of women, older persons, children, and partially disabled per-
sons to maintain the pace of work set by industry, and by the variations
in physical and mental capability of individuals at different times and
in different places. Almost nothing is known statistically about such.
variations and their relation to participation.
Changes in technology and machinery, improvement in lighting and
air conditioning, greater subdivision of tasks, and so forth, should have
influence on the degree of intensity of effort called for. The time re-
quired to travel to and from work might be included in intensity—or
in the length of the working day.
increases in supplementary or "fringe" benefits. Substantial increases
5The 1951 census of Britain offers a labor force classification by five social
class groups, but does not accompany it with any similar classification of
tion that would enable us to compute labor force participation rates by social
class. In any case "the grading is no more than a convenient rearrangement of
occupational unit groups and must not be considered as if it were a separate
classification of individuals." Census of 1951, Great Britain, Part I, p. XVIII.
0P. J. D. Wiles, "Notes on 'the Efficiency of Labour," Oxford, Oxford Economic
Papers, June 1951, pp. 158—174.
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in various benefits to employees have involved expenditures by employ-
ers that are not accounted for in straight-time wage rates. These include
pensions and social security contributions by employers; paid sickness
and hospitalization benefits; paid holidays; premium payments for holi-
day, overtime, and night shift work; unemployment compensation; and
annual employment or wage guarantees. A recent pilot study of a very
small number of manufacturing firms has been made on this question
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.7 But we do not know how much these
benefits have increased over time, to what extent they are available
to the whole labor force, and what their effect may have been on labor
force participation.
Changes in unionization. During most of the sixty-year period
covered in the United States, union strength comprised less than a
tenth of the labor force and consisted mainly of adult males who would
have been in the labor force in any case. Unions could not, therefore,
have had much effect on participation in this country in the earlier
years. Their role may have been greater in the other nations, and, in
the recent period, in this country; for between 1985 and 1947, unions
grew to about a fourth of the United States labor force and have since
stayed at approximately that level. They conceivably restrict job oppor-
tunities for women and children through qualifications and apprentice-
ship requirements and through rules on equal pay. Also they impose a
"tax" on earnings in the form of union dues, although these are not high
for most members. Influence of unions on labor force participation
would be difficult to measure, and probably is confined to affecting
which occupations and industries women and children enter. It is note-
worthy that the accelerated influx of women into the labor force since
1980 could occur in the face of the greatest increase of unionization
this country has experienced.
Changes in the distribution of income. In addition to increases in
average real income in recent decades, there probably has been a con-
siderable redistribution of income, before and after taxes. The structure
of income distribution has many theoretical consequences for labor
force—a notable one is its effect on rivalries in respect to living stand-
ards, and the need to work in order to keep up with (or ahead of) the
Joneses. Materials for an investigation of these aspects exist, but it
would be a considerable undertaking. Related to the income distribu-
tion among families is income distribution within families. Some wives
may have entered the labor force because their husbands were unwill-
ing, especially during inflation, to supplement fixed household allow-
Problems in Measurement of Expenditures on Selected Items of Supplementary
Employee Remuneration, Manufacturing Establishments,1953, Bulletin 1186,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 1956. The report was prepared by J. W. Bloch.
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ances which may have lagged behind the prices of food andclothing,
and even behind wages. It will be some time before there will be ade-
quate statistics on family budgets for the study of such a factor.
Changing burdens of credit. Any change in the ease with which peo-
ple can buy clothes, appliances, cars, and houses on the installment
plan could influence participation. Heavy commitments of future in-
come in order to buy durable consumer goods could easily oblige wives
to enter or stay in the labor force. Here again, lacking information, we
can only theorize from personal observation.
Changes in wealth and liquid assets. Whether an older worker, an
unemployed worker, a partially injured worker, or an expectant mother
can leave the labor force very likely depends to some extent upon past
savings or any net wealth accumulated in other ways, and upon the
liquidity of the assets. But there are no data through which to discover
the nature or amount of the relationship to labor force participation.
Changes in leisure-time activities. The last half century has seen a
great increase in the types and variety of non-gainful activities of the
average person: the widening interest in sports; the popularization of
movies, radio, and television; the use of automobiles for holiday and
vacation trips; the development of summer camps for teen-agers; the
extension of hobbies. All these have influenced participation, partly be-
cause they compete for a person's time, and thus may reduce participa-
tion; and partly because they may call for higher income, thereby in-
creasing participation. Comment on the nature of this influence would
be worth little in the absence of quantitative information.
Without systematic knowledge, of the foregoing factors and many
other elements of the problem, our answers to the central questions of
this investigation are incomplete, hesitant, and speculative. Do changes
in income influence labor force? Probably yes—provided other things
do not change very much. Under comparatively static conditions, the
higher the income the lower the participation, with rather great changes
in income required to bring about moderate changes in the over-all
participation rate.
There is, of course, the theoretical possibility that what we have seen,
rather, is a reverse influence of labor force on income; i.e. a large labor
supply might depress the level of wages. But such a reverse effect
could scarcely amount to much. For one thing, the significance ofa
large or small labor supply depends much more on its size relative to
the quantity of land, capital, management, and technique thanon its
size relative to population. For another, labor force size is only one
dimension of labor supply—the others being hours, effort, and labor
force quality—so that changes in labor force size are only one supply
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factor influencing wages. For still another, even if labor supply affects
the level of wages, it would probably influence mainly the share of
labor in the total income and would have only a small impact on the
absolute level of earnings per worker; in view of the smallness of labor
force changes relative to income changes, such a reverse effect would
be a case of a small tail wagging a large dog. Finally, it is scarcely
likely that, say, the high participation of a wife. could be the cause of
low earnings of the husband—unless one makes much of the occasional
husband who relaxes his effeorts greatly because his spouse has taken
over some of the breadwinner's responsibility.
There is the theoretical possibility that both labor force and income
are jointly influenced by some third force. But what could it be? Age?
Sex? Color? Nativity? Child-care responsibilities of women? All, these
have been taken fairly well into account by standardization. Employ-
ment opportunities? They may well affect participation, but they can-
not explain away the inverse relationship between labor force and in-
come; for that has been upheld within the same metropolitan areas,
where the industrial and occupational structure is the same to poor
and well-to-do alike. Education? A three-cornered relationship of edu-
cation, income, and participation has been found for females; but since
good education goes with both high income and high participation, it
cannot explain away the inverse relationship between the last two.
Thus, although we do not rule out the possibility that the inverse as-
sociation between labor force and income at a moment of time has been
the jcint result of outside forces, we cannot easily imagine what those
outside forces could be.
Is the labor force influenced by changes in employment? Probably
•yes, in the case of severe or great depressions, of the kind experienced
during the 1930's—with, however, a very large increase in unemploy-
ment required to cause a small net decrease in the over-all labor force
participation rate. Probably no, in the case of employment changes
which are moderate and not associated with great changes in the size
of the armed forces. Inasmuch as the violent unemployment fluctuation
of the 1930's and early 1940's has been unique in our recorded history,8
it would seem that, except under unusual circumstances, the labor force
is not influenced by the quantity of employment Opportunities, i.e. the
per cent of those in the labor force who are able to find jobs. Whether
labor force is influenced by the quality of employment opportunity is
another matter. Many more women might be in the labor force if there
were an abundance of physically light, clerical jobs, than if opportu-
nities were confined to heavy, manual labor.
8StanleyLobergott, "Annual Estimates of Unemployment in the United States,
1900—1954," in The Measurement and Behavior of Unemployment, Princeton
University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1957.
3ÔSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
If participation is explained oniy feebly or not at all by dynamic
changes in income and employment, what does explain its behavior?
What explains the rather generally declining participation of young
and old people; the generally increasing participation of females (es-
pecially wives); and the generally stable participation of the whole
working-age population, during both long- and short-run periods of
peacetime and moderately high employment? What explanation will
also fit the great increases in labor force during World War II and the
decreases at the war's end—as well as the fact that, in the United States,
the stability of over-all participation has been confined to native whites,
with the participation of Negroes and foreign-born generally declining
in recent decades?
No single factor or small number of factors could entirely explain
such behavior in a complex and rapidly moving economy. In any case,
it would be impossible to isolate the effects empirically, for some of
the forces might well act jointly, and others send out waves of influence
in all directions, waves which may eventually break upon the labor
force after a considerable lag and as if deriving from other sources.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to single out a few dynamic forces that
are capable of explaining important elements of labor force behavior.
One of these may be the growing redundancy of working-age females
as a result of the declining birth rate and the rising survival rate of
women—which reduced the relative need for women in own home
housework. The effect of these demographic developments was prob-
ably accentuated by the advancing technology for the home. Together,
these reductions in the home housekeeping burden may account for the
great secular increase in the availability of females for gainful work.
And housekeeping responsibilities of women were further reduced tem-
porarily during World War II by substantial amounts, as a result of the
immense draft of men into the armed forces; this temporary reduction
provides a possibly important contributing explanation for the large
temporary influx of women into the labor force.
A second dynamic force was the dramatic increase in education of
the average woman, both absolute and relative to that of older men.
In conjunction with the growing need for clerical and service labor,
this probably gave women a comparative advantage over the less well-
trained and frequently overpaid older worker and the untrained child;
and it may account for ability of the market to absorb the increased
supply of women.
The increase of female workers may in turn have forced the exodus
of the young and older males. Women—better trained and better suited
for the jobs, and often willing to work for less—may well have out-
competed males in the job market and made employers ready topass
rules against older workers (which to so many have appeared to be
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the real force in compelling earlier retirement). In addition, the earn-
ings of the women could have helped finance longer schooling for the
young males and earlier retirement for the older ones. This pressure
exerted by women does not exclude independent reasons for the with-
drawal of males—growing incomes and cultural and institutional
changes undoubtedly played their parts, and the males who departed
for these reasons left a vacuum which helped draw women into the
labor force. But it is our hypothesis that the prime mover was the influx
of female workers, and that their displacement of the male worker helps
to explain the stability in over-all participation.
A third force would seem to have been the substantial reduction in
•the hours normally worked by the average labor force member, which
occurred in greater or less degree in all the four nations with hours
data. This reduction surely enabled many wives and mothers of school-
age children to work and still have time to shop, cook, and do a mini-
mum of house cleaning, rest a bit, provide husbands with some com-
panionship, and partake of some occasional amusements. It would also
help explain why the over-all participation of the whole working-age
population has remained relatively stable, instead of declining as• in-
comes doubled or tripled; for hours reductions were probably a more
convenient, flexible, and equitable means of spreading leisure than were
reductions in participation. A nOw powerful union movement will very
likely find hours reductions the most acceptable way of effecting any
future decreases in labor supply—whether those decreases represent
rising demands for leisure, as incomes rise secularly, or a falling de-
mand for labor, as employment declines in depressions. Union agree-
ments—as well as maximum hour laws, factory shift arrangements, and
growing suburbanization calling for longer commuting—would freeze
at the lower levels any hours changes that have been made for other
reasons. The demand for leisure has thus probably been definitely and
irrevocably shunted onto the track toward fewer hours, so that any
reductions in labor supply will continue to take the form mainly or
wholly of fewer hours and less effort per hour, with the labor force
staying close to its present and past percentages of working-age popula-
tion.
These three main forces—the release of. females from home house-
work and child care, the increase in the relative education of women,
and the reduction in the normal workweek—may furnish a major part
of the explanation of why participation rose for females, declined for
young and older males, and remained stable for the whole working-
age population, despite our expectation that rising income should have
led all of them to decline. That interpretation is not inconsistent with
our explanation of why foreign-born and Negroes tended to reduce
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their over-all participation: for these minority groups were doubtless
bringing their labor force tendencies into line with those of the domi-
nant native whites. The breaking down of occupational barriers may
have been partly due to rising incomes of the native whites, who could
be expected to offer less resistance to the competition of minority groups
for jobs when their own prosperity was relatively high—thus making
increasingly feasible the adoption by minority groups of the living and•
working habits of the native whites.
The three dynamic factors emphasized do not explain all, the labor
force behavior our study has revealed; especially they do not explain
the instability over time of the labor force participation of individual
cities. And rarely do they furnish a "tight" explanation of any labor
force development.
But this should not be surprising: many of the statistics used here
were less than satisfactory in either concept or measurement, and data
for the study of many factors were lacking altogether. Nor should it be
surprising if income turned out to play a larger role in the dynamic
behavior of labor force than our statistics could discover. Economic
forces may exert their influence mainly through social or institutional
channels, which wind in much the same way as do those ,of a great
river to sea. While the general course is there, its direction or rapidity
of movement at any one time or place depends on the terrain, in a
manner hidden from a lone, pedestrian explorer, able to follow its
meanderings for only a comparatively short part of the way.
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